INTRODUCTION
For most of history technological man has conceived, designed and built his pyramids, aqueducts, temples, cathedrals and bridges on the basis of divine inspiration, common sense and a considerable reliance on experience and precedent. The materials of construction have been generally those found in nature-stone, timber and vegetable fibre, supplemented by man-made bricks and mortar and fastenings of iron. Learning has been largely by trial and error and the transmission of accumulated knowledge has been through imitation and apprenticeship.
Occasional The fundamental elements of the cantilever structure are shown on Figure 3 , and comprise essentially a bracket, jutting out from a tower which is prevented from overturning by a similar bracket firmly anchored to a solid foundation. A pair of these structures support between them the suspended span which completes the crossing of the river. We will later have to consider some of the basic engineering involved in the design of the structure, but in the meantime we should note that the upper members of the cantilever are in tension, while the lower members act as struts and are in compression.
Cantilever bridges, by their very nature, lend themselves to being constructed outwards from the sides, without the necessity of temporary falsework to support the central sections.
HISTORY OF THE QUEBEC BRIDGE
The idea of a crossing of the St Lawrence River in the neighbourhood of Quebec goes back to 1852 when General E.W. 
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received In Phoenlxvllle from Cooper, they were passed on to the shops for fabrication.
We turn now to those design aspects which featured most prominently In the ultimate failure of the bridge.
The three main categories of loading for which a bridge has to be designed are (1) the 'live load,' which includes the traffic the bridge is required to carry, as well as the wind load, (2) the 'dead load,' which is the self-weight of the bridge, and (3) special loading conditions which can occur during construction.
The structure itself must have adequate strength to carry the combined effect of these loads safely. Tension members may be and often are made up of flat bars connected by steel 'pins.' Such an arrangement would not work in the case of compression members ('columns' and 'struts') since the bars would have insufficient stiffness by themselves to resist buckling. Subsidiary bracing members ('latticing') must be provided to increase the stiffness or the struts must be made in such a form (e.g. cylindrical) as to be inherently resistant to buckling. We have nov to consider the design of the compression members and in particular those of the lover chord, that part of the cantilever incorporating the distinct curve shovn in Figure 2 Blrks to Cooper and Phoenixville for advice. This suggestion vas not welcomed by the two engineers who felt they would be ridiculed. In particular Birks felt that the bend must have occurred prior to construction and was not due to the gradually increasing erection load.
[Birks] knew better than anyone else on the work the care with which the calculations and designs had been made, he was familiar with the experience and abilities of the designers, and could calculate that the stresses were then far below the expected maximum. Another characteristic of the ultra school of American bridge design is the reliance placed on formulae, which appear to be used as a substitute for judgment rather than as an aid to it.
[21]
The Canadian Engineer of 13 March 1908 included a summary of the Commission's Report with little comment, but saw fit to print in a later issue a letter from a certain A.6. Midford, which concluded with chauvinistic fervour:
The Yankee has had his opportunity and failed. Now that the Quebec Bridge is to be nationalized and-Including its failure-paid for by Canadians, it is high time that Canadian engineers should design and erect it, for with them the habit of dropping into the river half erected or completed bridges has not become chronic. The editorial vent on to assert that it vas of course in favour of college training for engineers, but stressed that such graduates had an obligation to be 'even more practical than the vorkman,' there being lessons to be learned on the shop floor vhich cannot be taught in the classroom.
It is of course true that things like this have been said many times before; but the trouble is, ve have not taken them to heart. We have supposed that they referred to the men vho try to do professional vork vith nothing but theoretical knowledge. It has not occurred to us that the men in the top ranks of the profession, vho have been building great engineering vorks for nearly a lifetime, needed such admonitions. And yet that is vhat the event shovs. We all of us, juniors and seniors alike, need to knov more, -to test our theories constantly in the light of nev knowledge vhen it comes, veil attested, from any source. Yes, surely, the great lesson from this greatest disaster is the lesson of humility. The most conspicuous error in design was, in my view, the omission of the iterative process which equated the design dead load to the weight of the structure. The result of this neglect meant that the bridge was virtually doomed to failure before a single piece of steel had been erected. As the load on the bridge increased during construction, the growing stresses would inevitably seek out the weakest elements of the bridge's fabric, and it would only have been by the providential absence of any unfavourable circumstances of an secondary nature that a very weak bridge might have been completed. And then all traffic would have been at risk. If, conversely, the bridge had been designed for its actual dead weight, it is conceivable that the other shortcomings would not have caused failure, but, again, a less than ideal structure would have resulted. the latter failed to apply their technical knowledge in response to Klnloch's concerns.
We have already noted one aspect of the first Quebec bridge which was unusual, namely that all stages of the design were carried out by the contractor. No separate charges were made for this service, the cost of which would be absorbed in the billing rates for the manufacture and construction of the bridge itself. Once these rates were fixed, any cost saved by cutting corners in the design would be reflected in an increase of the contractor's profit.
The more normal practice was, and remains, that the early design studies, as well as the basic final design, including the general sizing of the members and preparation of technical specifications, are carried out by a staff of engineers working directly for the client. Whether this staff is directly employed or a firm of consulting engineers is engaged, the important fact is that the sezvice is paid for. The contractor may or may not be invited to submit alternative designs at the tendering stage. Certainly it is quite common for the contractor to prepare detail drawings, subject to the approval of the client's engineers, of such elements as the joints between members, and he will always prepare his own shop drawings for the manufacture and fabrication stages. Again, during the construction phase the client will engage a competent supervisory staff to oversee the work of the contractor in the field. A similar procedure was followed and played an important role in the case of the second Quebec bridge.
But we must repeat that this procedure for the execution of a major public works project was already established practice when the Quebec bridge was first promoted. The initial blame for the 1907 disaster must rest with the Quebec Bridge Company for failing to recognize that there is no such thing as free engineering.
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